For english readers of my blog : at your request, i'm giving the original version of the Tom's Cooper interview about Syrian civil war and military operations in 2013. Enjoy it !
Since
spring 2013, the Syrian Army seems to gain upper hand. Is the
victory in al-Qusayr campaign (some sources underscore an
operational level with strategic results for this campaign) a
turning point ?
Al-Qusayr
was no 'turning point' in this war. Al-Qusayr was important because
it represented the first significant involvement of Hezbollah on
regime's side, and because it represented the first important win
(for regime) in this war. But, it was no 'turning point'.
Several
other, much more important developments took place in 2013, which
have caused a significant shift in balance of forces on the
battlefields of the Syrian Civil War, but there is no ‘turning
point’ – yet.
Even
now, when the forces fighting on the side of Syrian regime are back
to about 100,000 troops, all the forces combined – the Republican
Guards division (RGD), the 4th
Armoured Division (4th
AD), the National Defence Force (NDF), the Ba'ath Party Militia
(BPM), special forces and regular units of the Islamic Revolutionary
Guards Corps (IRGC, from the Islamic Republic of Iran), two brigades
of Hezbollah from Lebanon, and about a dozen of various Shi’a
militias (so-called ‘Hezbollahis’; primarily from Iraq, but also
from Azerbaijan), recruited, organized, armed and supplied by Iran –
still cannot bring the situation under control. At best, some of
units in question proved capable of undertaking effective offensive
operations limited in scope, which is different to all the earlier
operations run by regime’s Syrian units.
In
fact, from tracking their operations through this year it is obvious
these ‘new’ regime’s forces are playing the role of a
‘fire-brigade’.
- After al-Qusayr, the regime attempted to secure all of Homs. Deploying Hezbollah there, they managed to clear one of major insurgent-held districts but at the price of time and losses.
- Meanwhile, the situation in Eastern Ghouta became critical, with insurgents threatening the Damascus International Airport (IAP). So, the regime insisted on a new offensive in this area. The Iranians rushed Hezbollahi units into this area, but these were too few to manage much more but cut off most of insurgent supply routes (furthermore, some of Hezbollahi units are at least as often at odds with each other, as they are fighting Syrian insurgents).
- The insurgents meanwhile launched their offensive into Lattakia Province. With its ‘home base’ under threat, the regime once again insisted on rushing reinforcements in that direction. Like before, Iranians were not the least happy (actually, debate between them and Damascus lasted for nearly a week), but they gave in: all other offensive operations were stopped and reinforcements rushed to stabilize situation in Lattakia, while operations in Eastern Ghouta and Homs were left unfinished.
- Finally, the situation in Aleppo became critical because the garrison there – including one of RGD’s brigades – was cut off by rebel advances and became critically short on supplies. That’s why the regime – that is: IRGC special forces, two Hezbollahi units and elements of the 4th AD – launched its latest offensive in that direction, via Khan Nasser: to open a corridor through which it could re-supply that garrison. That’s little else but ‘stabilizing the situation’, no ‘turning point’ in this war.
The
Syrian Air Force has entered in the battle since summer 2012. It is
very common to say the Air Force is a big asset for the regime.
Moreover, the losses inflicted by armed opponents seems less
frequent since the beginning of 2013. Why is the Air Force so
important and what is his real effectiveness today ?
The
Syrian Arab Air Force (SyAAF) actually entered the war at latest in
March 2012. Initially though use of helicopters, primarily deployed
to re-supply dozens of besieged garrisons. Light fighter-bombers
entered the fray in late June 2012, in response to rebel advances on
Aleppo and Dayr az-Zawr. By November, the SyAAF was flying up to 250
sorties a day. This tempo decreased only due to bad weather, in early
2013, when the regime began deploying surface-to-surface missiles
instead.
Generally,
before Iranian-Hezbollah intervention, the SyAAF was regime's 'last
ditch attempt' in dozens of cases: most often, the air force was all
that remained between specific regime's garrisons and a clear-cut
defeat.
SyAAF’s
losses decreased since March/April 2013 for several reasons. One is
that intensity of operations decreased by more than 50%, partially
because of combat- and other sorts of attrition, and partially
because of weather. The SyAAF did not lose many fighter-bombers (so
far, the SyAAF lost only about 15 MiG-21s, MiG-23BNs, Su-22s and
Su-24s), but it did lose more than 50% of its Mi-8s and Mi-17s by
March this year. The Air Force Academy had to be shut down, partially
because of mutinies and defections, partially because its main bases
came under a siege (or were even overrun by insurgents). Out of its
formerly four squadrons only two remain operational; number of
helicopter units was more than halved, even some fighter-bomber units
had to be closed.
Furthermore,
the SyAAF flew so intensively during the second half of 2012 and
through early 2013, that most of its MiG-23BN- and Su-22-fleets run
out of their resources. These aircraft can be flown intensively for
about 600 hours. After that period, they require a complete, yet
lengthy (and expensive) overhaul, in the course of which they are
practically rebuilt. The main SyAAF overhaul facility, 'The Works' at
Nayrab Air Base (AB), on the military side of Aleppo IAP, was under
siege until a week ago, while workshops on other air bases could only
undertake limited amount of work. Therefore, large segments of the
SyAAF’s fighter-bomber fleet simply could not be overhauled, or if,
then only partially. That is why they ‘disappeared’ from the
battlefield, although not suffering particularly heavy losses.
Can
the rebels prevent the domination of the skies by the Syrian Air
Force ? They can take the air bases to destroy or capture the
aircrafts on the ground... but can they really reverse the air
control from the regime ?
Presently,
I do not see any of Syrian insurgent organizations becoming 'that
good', significantly improving their fire-power, or at least
improving their cooperation with other organizations as to undertake
such operations. Major Syrian insurgent organizations are far from
‘defeated’; actually, except for the so-called ‘Free Syrian
Army’ – much of which recently collapsed, partially even defected
(primarily because of lack of supplies and money) – most of them
are in very good condition, literally untouched by recent regime’s
operations. However, because the West stopped providing assistance,
there is presently a large-scale re-organization of insurgent network
in Syria, a kind of ‘clearing sale’: while many of moderates have
either already left in disappointment or are about to do so, parties
– primarily specific political groups supported from Arab states of
the Persian Gulf – that are offering more are literally buying
various of armed groups. For the time being, this results in plenty
of disunity, even in-fighting.
Genuine
Syrian insurgents are also facing a major threat in their back,
coming from such extremist organizations like the Islamic State of
Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/ISIS), which have hit them in the back and
took over sizeable portions of liberated areas in northern Syria.
This
results in a situation where even the largest insurgent groups are
rather preoccupied with internal reorganization, fighting the
ISIL/ISIS, and else, than with launching large-scale offensive
operations – whether against any of SyAAF air bases, or other of
regime’s garrisons.
On
top of this, and primarily because of US pressure, proliferation of
man-portable air defence systems (MANPADs), like SA-7s, by various of
Syrian insurgent groups is nowadays more limited than ever before.
Finally,
SyAAF pilots have also learned their lessons. The regime is not
insisting on helicopters dropping supplies over besieged garrisons:
this is now primarily done by transport aircraft, which remain
outside the range of most of insurgent weapons (had the SyAAF not
stopped earlier practice, it would have lost its entire Mi-8/17 fleet
by about now). Fighter pilots have also learned a lot; they adapted
their tactics to better suit local circumstances, they are using
precision guided ammunition much more than before. This means they
became better at avoiding ground fire.
Recently,
the losses in tanks/AFV are decreasing. Is it due to a change of
tactics, or allies advising and training (Iran...), or both?
This
is primarily related to following factors:
-
a) Until spring 2013, original – or should I say ‘genuine’ –
regime units tended to drive their armour and mechanized forces into
urban areas, with unavoidable results (heavy losses in tanks and
other armoured fighting vehicles); the insurgents would easily
surround the forces in question, isolate them from infantry, and then
annihilate them. This is nothing new at least since German
experiences in Poland, in 1939.
-
b) Meanwhile, it is not only so that the regime lost services of
practically all of former Syrian Arab Army (SyAA) armoured and
mechanized formations (these either defected or were destroyed in
combat), but is also suffering a latent lack of fuel. For example,
the RGD is practically immobilized since weeks, because the fuel is
needed for offensive operations undertaken by the 4th
AD and mechanized elements of the NDF north of Damascus, and in
Aleppo area.
-
c) Finally, primary tools of regime’s forces nowadays are Iranian,
Hezbollah and Hezbollahi formations. Although the IRGC is operating
own armoured formations, at home in Iran, and although some of IRGC
units deployed in Syria do serve as 'mechanized infantry' with the
RGD, generally, the Iranians, Hezbollah and various of Hezbollahi
formations are a mix of special forces (even SWAT-type of assets),
light infantry, and militias. Lately, they are undertaking most of
their attacks by night - even in urban areas. They rely on armour
only for crossing open areas. By day, they are operating with support
from a very effective combination of air power and artillery, which
are successful in suppressing insurgent anti-tank teams.
Because
of this combination of factors, the insurgents are simply getting
fewer opportunities to shoot at any armoured fighting vehicles
(AFVs).
For
the end, what is the situation of the Syrian Army? Are regular
formations depleted? Is the survival of the regime dependent of the
use or incorporation from militias (NDF, Iraqi Shiites) and the
support or direct intervention of the allies (Hezbollah, Iran etc.)?
To
the best of my knowledge, the SyAA does not exist as such any more.
Of course, it is mentioned a lot in nearly all of regime's releases
for the media, and by nearly all of the foreign media. However, while
regime’s media has little choice but to follow instructions about
what to report, foreign media neither has insight, nor understanding
about the composition of regime’s forces (average journalists also
do not care), or is kept well away from the battlefield. Whatever is
the case, fact is that there is practically nothing left of the SyAA.
It suffered so much from mutinies, defections (entire divisions have
collapsed in late 2011 and through 2012), losses, and refusals to get
mobilized, that it is practically no factor in this conflict.
No
doubt, the regime appears to be operating a number of 'SyAA' units,
such like:
-
The RGD: this division was actually no part of the SyAA, but under
direct control of various members of the top regime circle. This
‘crack’ unit, responsible for the defence of Damascus, is
meanwhile down to two, perhaps three operational brigades (compared
to six at the start of the war). The IRGC had to deploy an entire
brigade of own infantry to beef-up this formation (apparently a
2,000-man mechanized infantry brigade from the 8th
Division IRGC), and one of Hezbollahi units is manning even some of
its T-72s (many of which are meanwhile badly worn out).
-
The 4th AD; 'officially' a part of the SyAA, but actually also under
direct control of the regime and thus outside the SyAA’s command
structure, at earlier times; meanwhile, this formation is also down
to two operational units, that is, two brigade-sized task forces.
Their morale is so shaky, that they tend to flee the battlefield
under anything but most favourable conditions (like about a week ago,
when they broke under insurgent attack and left a company of
Hezbollah to get overrun). Like the RGD, remaining manoeuvring
elements of the 4th
AD are beefed-up by IRGC troops and, more importantly, one Hezbollah
brigade.
-
Of all the other former SyAA units, there are something like 2-3
'manoeuvring' task forces, roughly resembling mechanized brigades in
composition, mobility and firepower. Each of these consists of
core-cadres of various former 'elite' units of the SyAA. Usually,
these are Alawite officers and loyal Sunnis that used to command
various divisions, brigades, regiments etc., that fell apart. Most of
such formations have meanwhile been re-organized as parts of the NDF
and the BPM. For example, remnants of the former 3rd Armoured
Division 'melted' into what was subsequently designated the 76th
Brigade. By the time this was re-deployed to Lattakia Province, in
August this year, this 'brigade' suffered such losses that it was
down to two operational battalions and had to be reinforced by
several NDF battalions from Tartous area. Thus came into being the
notorious 'Death Brigade'. There are similar examples for elements of
the former 3rd Armoured Divisions, and several of special forces
regiments of the former 14th and 15th Divisions.
The
rest of what was left of the SyAA are essentially 'garrison forces':
loyalists locked into their barracks and isolated by insurgent
advances already since months (in some cases nearly two years). Most
of 'formations' in question consist of exhausted officers and other
ranks, armed with worn out equipment and are unable of conducting
anything else but limited defensive operations.
But,
as such, none of the above mentioned former SyAA units is existent
any more. Therefore, yes, the Iranian- and Hezbollah-interventions
were crucial for regime's survival.
This
might need some additional discussion. Surely, this above-mentioned
situation 'emerged/developed' during 2013. But, that is why this
answer of mine is related to your question about al-Qusayr. At the
time the Hezbollah launched its attack on al-Qusayr, what was left of
the regime's forces was on the brink of collapse. Without
Iranian-Hezbollah intervention launched in period February-June 2013,
the regime wouldn't have survived this summer. What happened was that
the Iranians began hauling in Hezbollahi 'volunteers/mercenaries'
from Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Azerbaijan and elsewhere, and then entire
IRGC units to Syria, plus managed to prompt Hezbollah to get most of
its armed forces involved in Syria too. Tehran also intensified its
financial support for Damascus (this is meanwhile assessed at about
US$1 billion in cash and 500 million in fuel – provided every
month). Together with latent disunity and supply problems of
insurgents, this stabilized regime's position; bought it time to
reorganize SyAA-remnants, build-up the NDF, expand the Ba'ath Party
militia, recover thousands of wounded officers and other ranks etc.
However,
this intervention and the battle of al-Qusayr were no 'turning
point', because not only the Hezbollah but also the IRGC have
suffered quite some losses early during their involvement in Syria.
Offensive COIN operations in urban areas – one of most complex
forms of land warfare – were something entirely new for them. They
had to learn their lessons (rumour has it the IRGC has 'spent' nearly
a battalion of its troops learning just the ‘basics’). The
Iranians, but also Hezbollah, needed time to prompt – sometimes
outright ‘force’ – various regime's commanders to accept not
only their advice, but also leadership on the battlefield, to accept
specific necessities and realities; they had to force the regime's
military to start operating in entirely different fashion than
before, and they needed time to re-train significant parts of the NDF
and the Ba'ath Party Militia with new armament acquired from Russia.
Meanwhile,
the regime launched that attack with chemical weapons in Eastern
Ghouta, in late August 2013 - with repercussions it could never dream
about. Surely, for the next month or so, there was plenty of debate
about USA and/or NATO launching a military intervention against the
regime. But, what happened instead? With help from Moscow – which
is happily cashing for provision of military aid – the regime then
negotiated its CW-disarmament, in turn buying free hand for
large-scale offensive operations against insurgents.
Arguably,
regime is launching ‘one offensive after the other’ ever since.
However, and as described above, these operations remain limited in
scope and success. The latest operation saw a combination of IRGC
special forces, two battalion-sized formations of Hezbollahis, and
one brigade from the 4th
AD, ‘punching through’ the insurgent siege of Aleppo garrison,
taking Khan Nasser and then advancing on Aleppo IAP and into the Old
City. No doubt, planning and logistics for this operation were
brilliant.
Actually:
the Iranians correctly concluded that Jabahat an-Nusra (JAN) forces
in al-Safira and ISIL/ISIS forces in their back are rather
preoccupied by destroying the Free Syrian Army and other insurgent
groups and taking over, than preparing themselves for serious combat
operations. Thus, the ‘regime forces’ hit at the right moment and
place. However, even this is no ‘turning point’, because the
regime is still lacking in troop strength, supplies and even
operational skills: as soon as the main body of this force was busy
fighting in Aleppo, the JAN found it relatively easy to counterattack
‘behind the flank’ of the regime and – time and again – close
that corridor in Khan Nasser area again. We are yet to see whether
the regime has enough resources to secure this area.
For
the end, I would like to come back to regime’s attack with Chemical
weapons (CW) on East Ghouta, in August this year. I find that this
was an even more important moment in this war than the battle of
al-Qusayr. Reason for this is that the regime established another
‘precedent case’ – and came away better than before, like so
many times already. This is a pattern in this conflict that can be
traced back to its very beginning.
The
regime provoked this war because it could neither ignore nor suppress
widespread – and entirely peaceful – mass protests all over the
country. It had to instigate a civil war as this was the only way out
of a scenario the end of which was obvious, and thus began deploying
fake – regime-controlled – ‘Islamist extremist terrorist’
groups behind peaceful protesters, so they would open fire at
‘security forces’ that were ‘monitoring’ protests. Not only
that thousands of peacefully protesting Syrians were murdered in this
fashion, but when there was no Western reaction to this practice
(like in the case of Libya), the regime intensified not only such
operations, but also suppression of protesting beyond what we in the
West might consider as ‘imaginable’. The brutality of regime
operations eventually reached such proportions that it directly
caused countless mutinies and eventual collapse of the Syrian Arab
Army, and in turn prompted an armed uprising. As next, the regime
began recruiting and deploying members of one ethnic group to attack
other ethnic groups and thus provoke an inter-ethnic and
inter-religious war. It left the core of the group that established
the ISIL/ISIS to bribe its own, regime’s commanders and enter Syria
– for no other reason but to get the kind of enemy it claimed to be
fighting from the start of protesting. When there was no reaction
from the West, the regime intensified the war even further, and began
deploying air power. Initially, only helicopters were used against
early insurgent groups. When aerial ‘punishment attacks’ on
civilian population within areas liberated by insurgents grew in
numbers and intensity, insurgents launched their major attacks on air
bases in Idlib Province, and offensives into Aleppo and Damascus, and
secured a large area between central Homs and ar-Rastan, in summer
2012. The regime then began deploying light fighter-bombers,
primarily Aero L-39 Albatross and MiG-21s. When there was no Western
reaction to this, the regime began deploying heavier fighter-bombers,
like Su-24s, and then MiG-23BNs and Su-22s. When there was no Western
reaction to this, the regime deployed the SyAAF in full force, in
October 2012, and then began deploying chemical weapons, etc.
Obviously,
the regime every time launched a ‘test attempt’ and then waited
to see Western reaction. When Western reaction remained limited to
‘diplomacy’, the regime had its precedent and continued the
practice, further intensifying the conflict.
The
CW-attack on Eastern Ghouta was a sort of ‘pike’ in this pattern.
Indirectly, it resulted in regime’s agreement to destroy its
stockpile of CWs. However, in turn, the West – which missed
countless opportunities to get involved on the side of insurgents
(supposedly because they were disunited, could not establish ‘even
a government in exile’, and because they included ‘extremist
Islamists’), as hoped for by so many Syrians – has ever since
practically ceased its support for insurgency. It has left the Syrian
revolutionaries at the mercy of domestic warlords, various Islamists
from Arab countries in the Persian Gulf, and especially to host of
Islamist extremists groups. This is outright tragic, then when the
latter began calling for ‘Jihad in Syria’, back in summer 2011,
they were ridiculed even by Syrian Salafists. With other words, and
in what is certainly absurd, through failing to support the Syrian
uprising against the Assadist regime, the regime and the West have
happily opened Syrian population (60% of which is younger than 20) to
extremist influence. That is, de-facto, creating another Yemen or
Afghanistan – and all of this for supposedly gaining ‘improved
security for Israel’?
Frankly,
I find this very short-sighted, and can neither imagine this
improving security of Israel, or Europe and the USA in the future.