Thanks
Mr. Morant for his help in writing this post, in particular for the
identification of material.
After
analyzing the attack of the Syrian rebels on 3 of the 4 checkpoints
surrounding the Hamadiyah military base (Idlib province) in July
2014, with Mathieu Morant,
I propose this time to reconsider another operation by Syrian rebels,
in a completely different military context. The siege of Mleha indeed
does not take place in rural areas, where stood the base of Hamadiyah
(although it adjoins the town of Maarat al-Numan), but close to the
capital, Damascus, in a space densely urbanized. I focus here
voluntarily, again, about the rebel side, and I did only mention the
regime forces when the text needs it. Actors and forms of combat are
changing but we can also distinguish common features, tactically, in
the insurgent landscape. The analysis will focus here specifically on
the successful attempt to break the blockade around Mleha by the
rebels, especially from outside, August 3, 2014, which is the work
mainly of one of the most powerful rebel formations : Jaysh al-Islam.
Mleha :
a 135 days-siege (April 3rd/4th-August 2014, 14th)
The
city of Mleha, southeast of Damascus, was the scene of a fierce
battle between the Syrian regime and rebels since April 2014 to 14th
August. Regime forces begin their assault on April 3, even though
they also renew their offensive against the Jobar neighborhood in the
east of the capital. Mleha is indeed considered one of the entrance
of the eastern Ghouta, still held by the rebels, despite the cordon
set up by regime forces around the latter region (which also had
taken the chemical attack of the month of August 2013) and fighting
in Qalamoun (since fall 2013), neighboring mountainous region of
Lebanon where some supplies to the eastern Ghouta come from. On May
2, the rebels launched an attack and come to occupy the northern part
of the neighboring town of Jaramana, where many Druze serve in the
pro-régime forces.
The next day, regime forces strike back and move to the heart of the
city on May 4 ; Hezbollah plays a significant role in this
breakthrough. On May 5, a contingent of rebels arrives from Duma and
assaulted regime forces who install the siege of the locality.
|
Maps of the conflict in Damascus and its region, 2013-2014. |
At
that time, the regime has already committed to Mleha the Republican
Guard (which leads the siege), some surviving elements of the old 4th
Armored Division, another praetorian force of the regime, the
National Defense Forces, Iranian military advisers, Iraqi militia
(including the new militia Liwa al-Assad Allah Ghaleb),
other militias (like the Arab Nationalist Guard)
and even Hezbollah
(a full brigade), ie much of the range of the forces at his disposal.
Iranian drones are also seen in May over Mleha. The air raids are
particularly strong over the city. Regime forces, as they encounter
too much resistance, withdrew to let the aircraft and artillery to
crush all opposition, probably to limit losses in infantry. This does
not preclude the General Hussein Ishaq, commander of the air defense
system (a branch of the air force) to be killed in battle May 18th.
Into rebel side, fighting is mainly driven by Jaysh al-Islam,
Zahran Alloush group's (member of the Islamic Front), al-Nusra and
some other local armed groups, such as al-Rahman Corps
(a brigade in Mleha ; another, equipped with American TOW operates in
eastern Qalamoun), but also the brigades and battalions al-Habib
al-Mustafa,
members of the Islamic Union Ajnad al-Sham,
the rival coalition for Jaysh al-Islam in the east of Damascus, born
in November 2013.
|
Map showing Mleha in Damascus Region (yellow circle).-Stéphane Mantoux. |
Trapped
inside the city surrounded by the regime since 9/10 July, the rebels
attempted a first breakout on July 16, preceded by the explosion of a
suicide bomber from al-Nosra. Several hundred fighters then try to
force the blockade the August, 3rd, joining the rebels
surrounded. But the regime tightens the noose and the besieged,
shelled by aviation and artillery, were forced to evacuate the city
ten days later. The last 400 insurgents evacuate Mleha towards Kfar
Batna and Jisreen, to the north, leaving behind their dead and heavy
weapons. The Islamic Front also evacuated the village of al-Bulaha.
The fighting in the last two days of the siege were particularly
fierce : pro-regime Iraqi fighters have lost 45 killed, claiming
killing 115 rebels. The rebels managed to keep using, for instance,
many tunnels for their logistics (including one measuring more than a
mile long) making progress particularly hard for pro-regime forces.
Jaysh
al-Islam : an example of a rebel group
Jaysh
al-Islam (Army of Islam), the group that controls most of the rebel
forces during the siege of Mleha, is the result of the reconstruction
of the Syrian insurgent landscape after chemical attack of 21 August
2013 and the agreement negotiated with the regime. The group was born
September 29, 2013 from the merger of fifty armed groups operating
mainly in the Damascus area. The core of the movement is, however,
Liwa al-Islam,
one of the most powerful of the rebel groups, born in summer 2011 and
which became Liwa al-Islam in 2012 ; this is one of the most active
factions of Damas.
Very critical of the Free Syrian Army and of the external political
representation of the uprising, Liwa al-Islam, led by Zahran Alloush,
receives the support more and more marked of Saudi Arabia.
Nearly two months later, Jaysh al-Islam joined six other groups to be
the most powerful coalition so far of the Syrian uprising, the
Islamic Front, created November 22th 2013.
Zahran Alloush also takes head of military operations of this new
coalition, among which Jaysh al-Islam is alongside Ahrar-al-Sham and
Liwa al-Tawhid, two other groups among the most powerful of the
insurgent landscape.
|
Liwa al-Islam flag..-Source :
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/4/40/Jaysh_al-Islam_logo.jpg |
|
Jaysh al-Islam flag.-Source :
https://www.facebook.com/islamarmynews/photos/a.561350980635794.1073741825.561251493979076/561353073968918/?type=1&permPage=1 |
Zahran
Alloush, head of Jaysh al-Islam, is known for his fiery speeches
emphasizing a sectarian war, which puts him hard with other rebels,
including within the Islamic Front . He is also a fierce opponent of
ISIS since 2013, became Islamic State (IS) in June 2014, that can be
seen at the time of escalation to the anti-ISIS rebel offensive in
January 2014.
However, Alloush has long good relations with al-Nosra, with which
the group fought in the Damascus area. In July 2014, Jaysh al-Islam
announced its merger with another component of the Islamic Front,
Suqur al-Sham. Here we find fractures already existing in the
creation of Islamic Front in November 2013. The two groups were in
fact part of a previous coalition, the Islamic Front for the
Liberation of Syria, born in September 2012, alongside Liwa
al-Tawhid, another formation of the Islamic Front. In contrast, other
components of the Islamic Front, including Ahrar al-Sham, were
themselves integral part of the Syrian Islamic Front, formed on 21
December 2012. Jaysh al-Islam and Suqur al-Sham then grouped under
their banner other large groups in a new alliance with 18
signatories, including the Syria Revolutionaries Front,
Harakat Hazm,
Jaysh al-Mujahideen,
the Islamic Union Ajnad al-Sham,
Noureddine al-Zanki brigades, the al-Sham legions,
Liwa al -Haaq and Protection Shields. Since 20-21 July, Jaysh
al-Islam is at the point in the fight against the presence of the
Islamic State in Yalda, a highly contested southern Damascus suburb,
along with the Islamic Union Ajnad al-Sham, al-Nosra and FSA groups.
Jaysh al-Islam wants at all costs to avoid the IS sets up in the
Damascus area, which it considers its turf.
|
Zahran
Alloush.-Source :
http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-1LpsQAe_DAk/UrzCjMRNfPI/AAAAAAAAFB8/8gq9j2jK0XE/s1600/20131123-185350.jpg |
Another
important feature of Jaysh al-Islam is being a rebel group fairly
well supplied with heavy weaponry. On 6 October 2012, Liwa al-Islam
capture two SA-8 Gecko launchers with at least six missiles.
Jaysh al-Islam use SAM missiles, especially against helicopters :
January 17, 2014, a Mi-17 is perhaps shot down by a SA-8 above
Daraya, south of Damascus.
Even more impressive though purely symbolic, Jaysh al-Islam has been
able to recover two planes L-39ZA on Kshesh airbase, which fell 12
February 2013, where just three squadrons operated using this plane ;
the group was able to put online a video where we see the L-39 evolve
over a runway.
Jaysh al-Islam would have taken advantage of Saudi money to bribe an
officer of the 4th Armored Division, praetorian unit of the Assad
regime, and acquire two tanks T-72AV and 2 combat vehicles BMP-1,
without we have more details on this case. In addition, the group has
developed its own craft workshops to develop the captured armored
vehicles, and changes are perhaps his greatest originality compared
to other rebel groups equally well equipped with armored vehicles.
Its fleet includes several tanks : some T-72AV, with one locally
modified (frontal armor and reinforced rear), some T-72M1 and T-55,
with one T-55M whom the shield was again changed in their workshops.
Several armored vehicles BMP-1 and AMB-S complement the fleet of
Jaysh al-Islam. Caught in large numbers in the region of Damascus,
ZSU-23/4 are often used for ground support, as shown in the example
of Mleha. While it is difficult to establish the exact number of
tanks and armored vehicles in service with Jaysh al-Islam, some
videos released by the group show 2 T-72AV, 1 T-72M1, 3 BMP-1, 1
AMB-S and 2 ZSU-23/4 move in convoy : it is not the most impressive
fleet of the Syrian uprising, and Jaysh al-Islam in fact makes only
limited tactically use of it, as shown by the example chosen in the
siege Mleha. However, it is important to know this fleet to
understand the condition of the battle.
|
Armored vehicles of Jaysh al-Islam, with ZSU 23/4 in the lead.-Source :
https://pbs.twimg.com/media/Bj5bAcpCEAAGGMJ.jpg:large |
Break
the Blockade : Sunday, August 3, 2014
On
Sunday, August 3, 2014, the rebels based outside Mleha launch an
attack to rescue hundreds of insurgents trapped in the city since
July 9, so 24 days.
This attack is combined with a push from the besieged to the outside.
It opens with the explosion of a suicide bomber of al-Nosra launched
on the positions of the regime in a BMP-1 packed with explosives.
The aviation is particularly active in supporting the regime forces
against ground attack and launch 5 raids on Mleha for a single day, 5
August.
The offensive to open a way to the besieged Mleha is conducted
primarily by Jaysh al-Islam, who loses fighters, like Abdul Rahman
al-Dirani.
From August 7, however, the regime managed to close around the
headquarters of the defenders of the city. On 12 August, they are no
less than 11 air raids that hit Mleha
and 22 artillery strikes.
On August 13, there are still seven air raids and a dozen missile
strikes on the city.
On August 14, the last 400 rebels trapped in Mleha withdraw from the
town.
According to the local council of the city, the rebels lost 400
killed during the siege of four months, while a thousand fighters
regime would lost their lives, not to mention dozens of vehicles
destroyed in combat.
According to the same source, the next day, the militiamen of the
National Defense Forces begin to sack the city.
|
Abu Alaa al-Tunisi, kamikaze from al-Nosra in front of the BMP-1packed with explosives. |
|
Red circles : regime positions around Mleha, for the siege ; yellow arrows : the breakout of the August 3rd.-Stéphane Mantoux. |
|
Red circles : regime position ; yellow : movements and forces of the rebels.-Stéphane Mantoux. |
Rebel
Groups/Coalitions | Commentary |
Jaysh-al-Islam
(Islamic Front) |
Conducts most of
the effort from the outside, the only one to engage armored
assets.
|
Al-Nusra |
Launches a BMP-1
which may be driven by a stranger (Tunisian ?) to pave the way for
the onslaught of other formations.
|
Brigades and
battalions al-Habib al-Mustafa (Islamic Union Ajnad-al-Sham)
|
Participates in
the breakthrough, but uncertainty about the exact role (outside,
inside ?)
|
Al-Rahman Corps
(dispose de missiles TOW américains, proche du label ASL)
|
Participates in
the breakthrough, probably from the outside. |
The
first video posted by Jaysh al-Islam on the breakthroug,h August 3,
shows the insertion of the first fighters across the corridor north
of Mleha, but beaten by an open fire of the regime from both west
and east. This corridor is the necessary step to link up with the
besieged. Infantrymen, wearing a blue bandana to avoid fratrices
shots, rush short to rally the protection provided by buildings, by
hiding behind a carcass T-72 which remained on the ground. At least
one of the attackers was killed during the advance. Suppressive fire
is provided by a RPG-7 shooter.
In this first video, the attackers may be moving from the north, on
the west side of the corridor west of the Rubber Plant, which would
suggest, as confirmed by a the following videos, the goal is to
prevent the firing on the corridor by cleaning the west and east
sides. A second video shows a building invested by Jaysh al-Islam
with food, in particular, abandoned by the men of regime.
The third video reveals some material taken in the same building : a
bulletproof vest, a Dragunov sniper rifle, a RPG with ammo.
The fourth video shows a T-72 of Jaysh al-Islam crossed a berm in
front of the mosque Dalati, on the east side of the corridor, then
progressing eastward to cover the infantry assault on the building
immediately south-east of the mosque, occupied by regime forces and
which also permits to fire on the corridor.
The building was taken after an assault from at least a dozen
infantrymen, including a RPG shooter (it seems that it is the
building which is seen before, with the spoils). A fifth video, a
little longer, posted a little later, on August 10, provides an
overview of the assault. It shows commanders of Jaysh al-Islam in a
visual recognition of the corridor and they determine the areas of
assault on a screen showing a satellite view of the battlefield : we
see, as confirmed by the previous videos, the attempt junction with
the besieged involves cleaning the sides of the corridor. A T-72,
previously seen, and a ZSU-23/4 of Jaysh al-Islam cover the infantry.
The camera also films a raid of a MiG-23 attacked by several
anti-aircraft guns mounted on pickups.
|
A T-72 of JAI. |
|
Infantrymen of JAI behind a T-72. |
|
Fighters of JAI take cover behind a destroyed T-72. |
|
Fighters of JAI run to assault. They wear a blue strip to avoid fratricide fire. |
|
Fighters of JAI move probably in the west part of the corridor, to the west of Rubber Plant. |
Islamic
Front,
the coalition which includes Jaysh al-Islam, has also posted a few
more videos relating to the operation of 3 August. The pictures
depict a second T-72 tank led by Jaysh al-Islam, which protects
advance of a dozen of infantrymen.
A second video shows a squad of infantry, with a RPG shooter,
progress through the buildings and enjoy the protection of the T-72
tank parked near.
A third sequence depicts the ZSU 23/4 Shilka of Jaysh al-Islam, which
the emblem painted on the side of the vehicle, used to fire against
buildings.
In a last video, one of the T-72 also intervenes to pound the same
objective as the Shilka.
|
A MiG-23 above JAI's fighters. |
|
A fighter of JAI shows a captured SVD. |
|
Among the spoils, a RPG. |
|
East for the corridor, JAI's fighters are assaulting a building occupied by regime forces ; they are throwing grenades inside. |
|
Assault among gardens. |
|
A fighter shoot with his AK-47 to cover his companions. |
|
Behind the wall around the building assaulted above. The squad has a RPG shooter. |
Another
group that participated in the battles of Mleha is the brigades and
battalions al-Habib al-Mustafa
and which belong to the Islamic Union Ajnad al-Sham, the rival
coalition of Jaysh al-Islam on the Damascus area, but strengthened
its cooperation with it for several months. On 4 August, the group
puts online video showing the destruction of a T-72 tank of the
regime in Mleha.
A second video suggests that the group actually participated in the
attempted connection between besieged and forces outside of town.
Another video posted later, on August 8, shows the tunnels used by
the defenders inside the city and the proximity of the front lines in
the urban context : you can see the flag of the regime and improvised
barricades by regime forces.
Two days after the fall of Mleha, August 16, the group launches the
trailer of an upcoming documentary devoted to the siege.
For its part, the Islamic Union Ajnad al-Sham, a coalition which
includes the unit, is posting a short video the Aug. 8 showing attack
on the 3rd August into the corridor north of Mleha
explained on screen with a projection.
|
Not far from brigades and battallions al-Habib al-Mustafa, regime positions with flag of the regime. |
|
August 3rd : a T-72 burned by missile. |
|
A RPG shooter with his weapon. |
|
Posed picture of a fighter. |
|
An another T-72 of the regime tries to help the other which is hit. |
|
Tunnel in Mleha. |
|
August 8th : a video maken by IUAAS about the breakout of August 3rd. We recognize the map of the corridor. |
Last
group to take part in the battles of Mleha is the al-Rahman Corps,
including a brigade (another fight in the Qalamoun and has TOW
missiles). The unit is filming the explosion of BMP-1 SVIED launched
by al-Nosra to facilitate the assault on corridor.
We then see the infantry exchanging fire with the positions of
regime.
The men in the group wear blue bandanas to avoid fratricide fire,
like those of Jaysh al-Islam, which probably indicates a certain
degree of coordination among the groups involved. The al-Rahman
Corps also committed several armed pickups with heavy machine guns,
one with a ZPU-2, another with a 23 mm gun, one with a 14.5 mm gun.
On 6 August, the group puts online video showing the use of a 23 mm
gun mounted on makeshift lookout for sniping.
Another video shows the use of a improvised gun.
On 14 August, a video shows the use of several mortars.
|
The BMP-1drived by the foreign fighter of Al-Nusra has exploded. |
|
Improvised 23 mm for sniping. |
|
Homemade canon in action, Al-Rahman Corps. |
|
The fire is open on regime positions. |
Rebel Group | Type/Number of
armored vehicles |
Jaysh al-Islam |
2 T-72 tanks at
least (1 AV et 1 M1) and 1 ZSU 23/4 Shilka used for ground
fire.
|
|
The MiG-23 seen closer. |
|
Recon from the commander of JAI before the attack. |
|
Some shotscreens of the ZSU 23/4 with the emblem of JAI. |
|
Some screenshots of the T-72 from JAI, 2 or 3 are used in the battle. |
|
A JAI's fighter killed during the advance in the west of the corridor. |
|
Before the attack, JAI's commanders shows the way of attacks in a satellite view of the battlefied. Again we recognize the corridor. |
Conclusion
Analysis
of the rebel attempt to break the blockade imposed by the regime to
Mleha, August 3, offers interesting conclusions, especially when
compared to those issued at the time to complete our first article on
the assault of the checkpoints around the Hamadiyah military base. In
this case, rebellious side, there is a major player, Jaysh al-Islam.
The al-Nosra front has merely provided a suicide bomber who, as so
often in the Syrian conflict, acts as "consumable artillery"
to compensate for the lack of firepower -the group has still not
communicated about the last moments of Mleha siege. The rebels,
unlike Hamadiyah, seem to lack artillery here, even homemade : the
guns/mortars are much less prevalent than in Idlib province. The
other two identified groups have played a lesser role in the
breakthrough. Jaysh al-Islam embodies probably pretty well the degree
of military sophistication reached by the most powerful rebel groups
after three years of war. Training Zahran Alloush's group has an
armored component whose crews, we know from the publicity that the
group has made, benefit from training in a school of mechanized war.
Videos of the engagement of August 3 clearly show the need to
preserve the T-72 and ZSU 23/4 of the destruction, even if the tanks
in particular provide protection for advancing infantry, as to
Hamadiyah. We also note that vehicles make not an extreme consumption
of ammunition. Moreover caution prevails since the numbers of
vehicles in relation to the available fleet is altogether limited.
More broadly, the rebel planning is measuring by the size of the
operation, which aims to re-establish contact with the besieged
isolated in the city for nearly a month. Visual recognition couples
to briefings from satellite images to facilitate progress. The
fighters wear armbands blue to avoid fratricide fire, a precaution
which had already noted in Hamadiyah. The tunnels, which have played
a large rôle to the rebel side during the siege of Mleha, probably
facilitated the delivery of forces and logistical supply. However,
there is no evidence of attention paid to the injured (no stretchers
or corpsmen are visible, which is not to say that there are not).
Note also that tactically, Jaysh al-Islam builds a real plan of
operations by choosing to target the buildings on either side of the
corridor north of Mleha who are required by the plan, and that
threaten with their fires the joining operation. These buildings are
attacked under cover of tanks, infantry advancing enjoying cover
offered by the urban context. The regime, meanwhile, give little news
on this rebel operation, rests primarily on firepower to win, setting
up a cord to strangle the rebels defending Mleha and reinstalling the
siege a few days after the successful breakthrough (that who may
testify as to their level of training provided by foreign advisers,
Iranians, etc). Insurgents have evacuated Mleha August 14 and
retreated around ; but the success of the regime was particularly
expensive. It took four months of siege, including almost three of
intense urban combat, to drive and encircle the rebels, with likely
heavy losses in men and vehicles that the regime can ill afford. Not
far from Mleha, northwest, insurgents also always fight in the
neighborhood of Jobar, east of downtown Damascus, and until recently
were able to launch attacks towards it.